Excerpted from the book Poverty, Wealth Dictatorship, Democracy: Resource Scarcity and the Origins of Dictatorship
by Jack Barkstrom
June 30, 1934 would come to be known as the "Night of the Long Knives." Adolf Hitler, fearful of losing power and convinced that rivals within his party were ready to betray him, ordered the murder of many of the people who had helped bring him to power. When the SS was through, perhaps as many as 100 people had been killed, some executed after being arrested and tortured, others assassinated in their homes.
It was something of an irony that many of the victims were leaders of Hitler's own SA (Sturmabteilung or Storm Detachment). The irony was that Hitler would destroy the very groups which had contributed so much to his political power. A lesser irony was that Hitler should draw his strength from working-class groups and the economic problems of workers, while being vehemently opposed to the labor movement. Unemployment, which increased in severity after the Great Depression began, caused many workers to join the SA. With increasing economic problems and unemployment, the political power of the SA and of Hitler, had grown. Yet Hitler would take decisive steps to eliminate the trade unions, even using the SA to carry out his directives. In March 1933 the SA and police began a campaign designed to destroy labor organizations, attacking and arresting union members and taking over their buildings.
Hitler's moves against the unions were only one example of the political repression which occurred under the Nazis. In its suppression of the unions, Nazi German differed little from the Soviet Union. It was a dictatorship complete with a secret police. Where Germany did differ from Russia was in the economic sphere. Nazi Germany had more resources than Russia. At the same time, its resource wealth was not at a level comparable to that of democracies, such as the U.S. or Britain. Fascist governments, if they represent a different form of dictatorship than communism, arise under resource conditions somewhere between the resource-starved economies conducive to communism and the resource-rich environment where democracies thrive.
Those who study fascism have found it difficult to come up with a clear definition of what of fascism is. Although Germany represents the most prominent example, the fascist "phenomenon" was not confined to Germany. The reason for the focus on Germany has primarily been related to the scale of the destruction which followed in the wake of Hitler's rule - the war which he began caused the deaths of nearly 40 million people and some six million people are believed to have died in the Nazi death camps. Perhaps it is the deliberate and grotesque way in which people were killed - in gas chambers - which focuses our attention, (although Russian secret police methods of execution could be just as diabolical). Perhaps it is simply the way in which the victims - Jews or gypsies - were chosen.
There were fascist movements in many of the countries of Western Europe. They did not achieve the same notoriety as Germany; some because they were unable to seize power, others because they did not possess Hitler's single-minded obsession with a goal far beyond merely staying in power. Where they did succeed however, they employed dictatorial methods similar to those of Hitler - opposing political parties were outlawed and political dissent was suppressed. Italy, not Germany, was in fact the first fascist regime. There were also fascist governments in Spain, Hungary, Romania, and Austria.
There is a temptation to approach fascism as a single event or unique phenomenon. Everything which occurred in the political and governmental realm can be explained by the personality of the individuals who led the movements. Fascism may be better analyzed however, by treating the political and governmental aspects separately. In other words, the political forces which brought fascist leaders to power were not identical to the bureaucratic mechanisms they used once they had taken over. Clearly Hitler put his own 'Nazi' stamp on the German government, once in power. At the same time, despite the strength of his personality and the scale of devastation which followed in his wake, his actual impact on the governmental bureaucracy may be somewhat exaggerated. If Hitler took pains to inspire the Gestapo and SS with a fanatical devotion, he was largely unconcerned with the routine activities of governmental file-clerks. Explaining fascist governments, in the context of day-to-day operations, may be an easier task than understanding the political motivations and beliefs behind the movements.
The one idea which fascists were identified with (or by), in every country, was a hatred of communism. What they were for seemed to depend on the country. There was a certain nationalism involved in most cases, which combined with an expansionist foreign policy. However, dreams of military conquest were often tailored to military capabilities. If Mussolini had wanted to truly resurrect the Roman Empire he so admired, he would have looked north to challenge Germany or England. Instead he settled on North Africa where desert tribes would be no match for his tanks or machine guns. Hitler, with a fully mechanized army, could dream of conquering Europe. Franco, although an army general, recognized that Spain lacked the military resources of either Germany or Italy. Military conquest was left off his agenda.
In very basic ways, fascism, like communism or any other political movement, depended on 'great' ideas to inspire a mass of people. Communism was more universal in its appeal - its goal was to help the masses in their struggle against capitalist oppression. It provided workers with a sense of belonging to a larger movement. If fascism provided a similar sense of belonging, the appeal was couched in terms of the individual country involved. Hitler's group was the mystical Nordic race to which all true Germans belonged while Mussolini rallied Italians to the ancient Roman Empire created by their ancestors.(1)
Those who have wrestled with the definitional problems surrounding fascism have tended to focus on the "crowd mentality," summarized bluntly by the question "Why did so many Germans blindly follow Hitler?" If the question suggests some trance-like crowd mentality, it is misleading in its factual assumptions. Not all Germans blindly followed Hitler or believed in his programs. Although Josef Goebbels' films of mass rallies gave the impression of fanatical adherents, behind the scenes it was the secret police who maintained order. If Hitler found mass support helpful on the road to power, he did not find it necessary once power had been achieved. A democratic majority was not necessary to the exercise of political power.
While the makeup of Hitler's followers gave him a powerful political base, the Nazi phenomenon cannot be explained in purely psychological terms. There were economic forces at work as well. Hitler came to power against a backdrop of hardship and unemployment. These conditions were not unique to Germany. In fact democracies, such as England and the United States, had to endure them.
There was one ingredient in the political equation which was present in greater amounts in the 'fascist' countries - violence. Whether it was caused by unemployment, the worst periods of violence seemed to coincide with some of the highest periods of unemployment. In Germany in 1932, there were some 5,575,000 unemployed, out of a total work force of 18,093,000, or a 30.8 percent unemployment rate. In the two months leading up to the Reichstag elections in July, there were 461 political riots reported by the Prussian police. In these riots 82 people were killed and 400 seriously injured. The number of deaths in 1932 was 84 Nazis and 52 communists. It is believed that the number of injured in 1932 totaled 9,715. (2)
Italy had gone through similar economic problems and a similar period of violence some ten years before. Mussolini made his famed March on Rome on October 28, 1922. During the two years which preceded the march as many as 300 fascists and 3,000 anti-fascists were killed in political fighting. Italy's unemployment rate was not as high as Germany's would be, but it was substantial. In the early part of 1922, it stood at 602,000, out of a total industrial work force of 4 million, or an unemployment rate of 15 percent. For those who were working, particularly agricultural laborers, the wages were just a little above subsistence levels.
In Italy the violence had an almost comical aspect. Rather than throwing stones or engaging in fist fights, the fascists brought in artillery and tanks. In some cases they threatened towns with these weapons to force elected officials out. In the autumn of 1922, political assaults occurred at the rate of 12 a day. In one incident in 1921, a group of fascists invaded the house of a local co-operative and forced the workers to run a gauntlet of knives and clubs. Thirty-eight people were stabbed, including old men, disabled soldiers, and a 14-year old. In February 1921 fascists murdered a communist leader in Florence after their afternoon procession was the object of a bomb attack. In one battle at Scandicci, the police and fascist squadistri attempted to storm positions held by workers. After being driven back they returned with artillery and armored cars, broke down the barricades and demolished the People's House. Workers in the town of Empoli became so nervous, that they fired on a lorry containing naval mechanics, simply on the rumor that it was a force of fascists. Eight were killed and ten were wounded. In August 1922, the fascists captured the city of Milan after three hours of fighting, burned the socialist presses and buildings, and threw the socialist government out. At Fiume they not only attacked the city but captured a destroyer, in retaliation for the killing of a fascist.
Spain experienced a period of violence not unlike that in Italy. In October 1934, the Socialists had tried to overthrow the government. By the time the revolt was put down over 1,000 people were dead. In the next eighteen months there were violent street demonstrations and strikes which culminated in the actual outbreak of Civil War in July 1936.
On the other side of the world, Japan, with its seemingly docile and conformist society, was rocked by political violence in the 1930s. Right-wing radicals killed the prime minister in 1931, along with other government officials. Still dissatisfied with official policy in 1932 they again targeted the prime minister for assassination, and were successful. In what was called the February 26 Incident in 1936, army officers went on a murder spree in which they killed the Lord Privy Seal, the Finance Minister, a Naval Admiral, the Inspector General of Military Training, the brother-in-law of the Prime Minister, as well as guards and servants.
The violence associated with the fascist period represented the extremes to which political expression would go, although it was symptomatic of deeper societal problems. On the economic side, unemployment, itself a serious problem, was also a symptom of a more serious problem underneath - the basic economic structure was undergoing change. Small businesses and merchants were losing wealth and power to large banks and industrialists. Small artisans and workers were losing out to large factories, with their increasingly automated methods of production. The strength of the labor movement and the level of unrest may have been different in each country, but labor problems existed, in one form or another, in each country where fascism made an appearance, whether in Germany or Italy, or in Spain or Japan.
Labor unrest could be attributed, in part, to increasing industrialization. With an increase in the size of the labor force there would be an expected increase in the number of problems. Ancient Rome and Revolutionary France were proof of that. At the same time the turmoil surrounding the fascist period is not totally explained by the growth in the labor force, or a market economy increasingly dominated by industry. There was something else - an economic circumstance which made the labor market unstable. It was all in the timing. The problem for workers was, not so much that they would enter the labor market, but that they would enter it at a time when the markets for the goods they produced were growing weaker. Specifically, markets were at the saturation point. If workers had come to rely on the market for survival, the level of dependence was out of all proportion to what the market could sustain. Employment, at a level desired by workers, in other words, was becoming a burden which the market could not support.
Whether the term instability could be accurately applied to the overall economic situation is not clear. Market saturation is simply an economic phenomenon, not in every case an indication of economic turmoil. However, when one particular sector of an economy experiences radical swings which make it unreliable as a predictor, it could be considered unstable. That would clearly be the case with labor markets when workers could not depend on them to provide employment from one day to the next. In the case of the fascist period, economic instability had the potential to spill over into the political realm, creating instability there.
Germany, in modern eyes, has been seen to be a model for mechanization and industrialization. Perhaps part of the reason is that the superiority of its technology was self-evident as German armies marched across Europe in the Second World War. Yet, technological advancement was a relatively recent development. In the 1800s Germany was still a largely rural society. In 1849 sixty-four percent of the population of Prussia lived in rural areas.(3) At the same time it was growing more difficult to survive by working the land. Peasants, as well as land owners, were struggling.
The growing market for industrial goods seemed to offer a solution. If weaker agricultural markets were eliminating the need for agricultural workers, those displaced were welcome to work in the factories. The urban working class began to grow in numbers. If the newly emerging markets of the industrial revolution seemed invincible at the time, it was only by comparison to weakening agricultural markets. Markets, which were strong in 1860, could weaken over time, creating problems which would appear in the 1930s. The problem was neither unique to Germany nor limited to a particular time period. Italy experienced similar problems in the 1920s. Both the German and Italian economies had the capability to physically produce enough to sustain their populations but neither economy could sustain the market demand necessary to keep workers fully employed.
In Italy, weakness in the market for goods and for labor evidenced itself, not so much in the lack of jobs, but in low wages. Factory owners would have argued that there were plenty of jobs available for those willing to work - suggesting that market demand for manufactured goods was, in fact, quite strong. Yet, if demand was strong and people could find jobs, why was there so much dissatisfaction among workers? Over a million industrial workers participated in 1,663 strikes in 1919 and their agricultural counterparts, some 500,000 laborers, participated in another 208 strikes. In 1920, the number of farm laborers who participated in strikes had grown to around a million, although there were only 189 agrarian strikes. The number of industrial workers who struck in 1920 remained the same, about a million, but the number of strikes had increased to 1,881.(4)
Why would strikes be an indication of market weakness? The large number of workers involved suggests just the opposite. If demand for goods had not been strong, why would factories have hired so many people in the first place? That fact alone would normally settle the argument. Unfortunately, it must be reconciled with the high level of discontent, which was related to low wages. How can strong market demand be reconciled with low wages? There was clearly some basic demand for manufactured goods or they would not have sold at all. Yet demand was only there so long as prices remained low. When prices were raised demand disappeared or was seriously weakened. Can demand really be described as "strong" if the market places price conditions on demand?
A political movement, such as fascism, is not explained away by suggestions that labor unrest was the cause. At the same time, fascist movements seemed to draw strength from a worsening economic situation. In Germany, the Nazis benefited directly from unemployment. As the number of unemployed grew, membership in the SA increased. In Italy sluggish economic conditions contributed to an increase in fascist ranks. Ironically, it was defections from labor which contributed to fascist support. Labor had proved to be an early and formidable opponent of Mussolini.
If labor unrest served as the backdrop to the fascist movement, there was a certain paradox in its operation. Hitler was openly antagonistic to labor, focusing particularly on its hated communist associations, while appealing to industrialists and large landowners. Mussolini adopted a more conciliatory stance toward, even forming his own organization of trade unions, which claimed some 500,000 members in 1922.(5) If he was less openly antagonistic he eventually took steps to curb their power. Hitler developed a strong following among the middle class - small shopkeepers, teachers and professionals - not necessarily unemployed, but threatened by economic circumstances.
If fascism grew out of economic difficulties, what was at its center? Was it primarily a belief system with economic origins? It has been said that people were seeking an answer to the chaos and destruction of the Twentieth Century. The technological advances which had promised to better mankind had instead produced massive battlefield deaths in the First World War and widespread unemployment and depression in the period after. Whether Hitler was right or wrong, he at least provided his followers with a sense of purpose. Certainty was one defense against a chaotic world. On the other hand, was fascism, at heart, an economic program which adopted certain beliefs to lend legitimacy to its goals. That view suggests it was just another political program, whose success could be attributed more to leadership skills, than to real problem-solving. Hitler, the consummate politician, was simply adept at tailoring his message to a particular audience. That may better explain why he could attract support from groups with potentially conflicting views. Workers and industrialists, traditionally at war with each other, found common ground in Hitler's message. They were joined by individuals from the middle class.
Did the answer come down to only two choices - between fascism, the belief system, and fascism, the economic program - or was the answer even simpler? Was fascism simply a political luxury which urban societies could afford to indulge from time to time? Why did Russia, which experienced economic difficulties, labor unrest, and political turmoil, not evolve into a fascist dictatorship? If Stalin's Russia has been classified as a dictatorship, what emerged in Russia has never been confused with the dictatorship of Hitler's Germany. In fact, the political concept of fascism is somehow foreign to Russia. What made the Soviet dictatorship different? The basic answer is Joseph Stalin. He looked to a bureaucratic solution rather than an uncontrollable mass movement, when it came to a political base of support.
Joseph Stalin aside, there are other obvious differences between Russia and Germany. Where Hitler had drawn support from both the middle class and industrialists in Germany, their power was inconsequential in Russia, for two reasons: first, there was no middle class to speak of in Russia and second, if the industrialists had once held any power, it was now in the hands of the state. Another difference was in the need for popular support. It played a smaller role in political decision-making in Russia. Where Hitler made an effort to enlist popular support through public rallies, Stalin focused more on maintaining Party support, while ignoring public opinion. Finally, unemployment or uncertainty about the job market, was the least of economic worries for the typical Russian worker. Russia did not avoid all problems with unemployment. In 1924 there were 1.46 million unemployed out of an urban labor force of about 8.5 million workers, or 17 percent. In 1929 there were 1.6 million unemployed. (6)
Russia, for all the industrial development which the Five-Year plans imply, remained largely rural. Even in 1939, the urban population of Russia was only 33 percent of the total. In 1926, the urban labor force in Russia was 22.6 million, out of a total population of around 147 million, or 15 percent of the population.(7) Germany, in 1932, had a total labor force of around 18 million, out of a total population of around 65 million people or roughly 27 percent of its population. The fact that Russia's work force was smaller did not prevent labor problems. Strikes had been a serious problem during the 1905 Revolution and in the February Revolution of 1917.
Russia seemed disadvantaged in nearly every way, when it came to industrialization. For all its problems however, Russia's weakness gave it one clear advantage. Because industry was incapable of producing enough it was unlikely that market demand could ever be satisfied. Market saturation was an unlikely possibility, given the fact that resources were scarce and industrial capacity limited. The same could not be said of the industrialized economies of the West. Market saturation was the problem for German industry. One other factor combined with market saturation to threaten the worker - in a word, automation. Even as German factories came close to achieving market saturation, that "goal" could be accomplished with fewer and fewer workers.
If there was a spiritual dimension to these economic circumstances, one that might tempt people to follow a Hitler, it lay in the psychological impact on those most vulnerable to economic pressures, the workers and middle class. German workers not only faced unemployment, but a society which provided them no alternative means of survival. By implication, those who were unemployed and ignored by the economy, were unneeded by society as a whole. If the Russian worker risked starvation in hard economic times, if he risked death or imprisonment at the hands of the secret police, he at least was needed by the Soviet economy. So long as that economic need existed his place in Russian society was secure.
Surprisingly, there was one area in which the economic policies of Nazism and communism was similar, that of industrial syndicates or trusts. Following the nationalization of industry in Russia in June 1918, production had been organized into trusts, based on the type of industry involved. Nazi Germany stopped short of nationalization, but it did authorize the government to create industrial cartels in July 1933. Some 30 existing cartels were reorganized under the law and 28 new cartels had been formed by November.(8) The government set production quotas, determined prices, and controlled wages. Italy, in September 1926, organized industry into twelve national syndicates, which were converted into 22 national corporations in 1934.(9)
Adolf Hitler was appointed chancellor of Germany on January 30, 1933. He had not been elected to the post, since it was an appointive office, but he had not seized power either. It would take eighteen months for Hitler to turn what had been the Weimar Republic into a dictatorship. In the July 1932 elections he received substantial support - 37.3 percent of the vote - but not a majority. However, dictatorships are not based on popular support. As Lenin had demonstrated, the secret to power was control of an apparatus of repression, such as the police or the military. At the same time, even dictatorships demanded some minimal level of support, if only within the governmental apparatus. Hitler could not have become a dictator by himself. What allowed Hitler to take power was a curious combination of circumstances. He was able to build up a following due to the economic conditions which existed in the late 1920s and early 1930s and he was able to take advantage of weaknesses in the German governmental structure. Like Lenin, Hitler found that it was relatively easy to frustrate attempts by a government to govern.
The next section looks at four things: 1) the historical development of Germany; 2) the form of government which was in place at the time Hitler was appointed chancellor; 3) the circumstances which surrounded his appointment; and 4) the early history of the Nazi Party and how it had developed by 1933.
While Hitler tried to inspire Germans with his visions of a great Nordic or Teutonic state, the historic reality was that Germany as a nation or country had very little history at all. Prior to 1814, 'Germany' had been nothing more than a group of principalities whose princes were interested in control of their own geographical domains. The state of Prussia claimed part of Poland, while Austria was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
The decision to try to organize the various principalities into a larger German state was taken, in large part, to control France. Napoleon's successes had convinced many in Europe that an additional military power would be helpful. Even before Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo in 1815, delegates to the Congress of Vienna were in the process of creating a 'German Confederation. 'The result was the German Confederation of 1815, which loosely allied some of the major principalities such as Austria, Prussia and Bavaria with some minor states, and managed to provide the group of 39 states with a constitution, in the form of the Federal Act.
While the Confederation had a constitution, it resembled a government only in form. Its members would not agree to set up a court system. It had a 'legislative' branch in the form of the Federal Diet or Bundestag but the individual states had been given sufficient power to veto most of its proposals. The defense of the Confederation members was perhaps the one area where there was agreement, although in reality Austria and Prussia provided most of the military muscle.
The Confederation, whose primary goal had been the military containment of France, could only serve as an idealistic model for a unifying German government. In 1848 and 1849 Germany was rocked by civil disorder which came to be known as the Revolution of 1848-1849. The Revolution would produce the first serious attempt to create a German government. In contrast to the Confederation, the new government was not to be a defensive alliance, but a governing body with real powers.
While the Revolution is dated from 1848, the states which were part of the Confederation had been experiencing severe economic distress prior to that time. The market for industrial goods had entered a downturn in 1846. Factories were closed and large numbers of people were thrown out of work. Much of agriculture still was dominated by laws which favored the landlord and continued the feudal system of dues. Where the feudal system was being ended the peasants had to compensate the landlords. In addition, blight and drought struck the harvests of 1845 and 1846 which brought famine in 1847.(10) The economic unrest brought violence to some of the towns in the winter of 1846-47.
When the citizens of Paris revolted in February 1848, the immediate result was a series of meetings in the German cities. In many of the states the princes were quick to surrender to demands for constitutional government. These independent actions were followed on March 1 by an attempt to revise the 1815 Confederation constitution. While labor disagreements to this time had been largely peaceful, the trend was toward more violence and the number of workers involved was growing. King Frederick William IV of Prussia, strengthened the Confederation by calling for constitutional changes in all the German states on March 18. On March 21, he called for the creation of German parliament. The king was hoping his moves would both appease the crowds, while placing him in a position to lead the growing movement. Instead violence increased in March and April. Cities suffered through rioting, while workers destroyed machinery in factories. In the countryside peasants turned their anger on the castles of their landlords.
The civil unrest no doubt contributed to the relatively quick movement toward democratic government. A Pre-Parliament met on March 31 and set a date for National Assembly elections of May 1, 1848. By May 18 the new Parliament was meeting in Frankfurt. The 585 members of the Frankfurt Parliament soon encountered the problem which had baffled the 1815 Confederation - the interests of each state differed. There was even a reluctance to elect an imperial administrator or Reichsverweser. Finally Archduke John, the brother of the Austrian Emperor Ferdinand, was offered the job. His government, administratively, was comprised of several ministerial posts. While there had been internal disagreement, the Frankfurt Parliament had gained enough prestige to be considered legitimate. The Federal Diet, the governing body of the Confederation, transferred its functions to Archduke John in July 1848.
The stalemate over the election of the Reichsverweser represented a minor squabble. In March 1848 Denmark had undergone a revolution and when a new government emerged it claimed the state of Schleswig as part of Denmark. This angered Germans who claimed that it was so closely tied to the state of Holstein that it should be part of the new Germany. Prussia sent in troops in April, which angered Austria and other major European states. Prussia, aware of the political problems created, withdrew its troops. The Frankfurt Parliament however, was fired up over the issue, and demanded a continuation of the war. When Prussia concluded an armistice in August, the Parliament rejected it. Then, on September 16, 1848, it accepted it. While the September 16 action may have been realistic, the crowds in Frankfurt were outraged. Having avoided civil unrest since March, the city erupted, all of its anger being directed at the Parliament. In contrast to the disturbances of early 1848, the authorities did not make concessions. Instead, Austrian and Prussian troops, using artillery, suppressed disturbances in Berlin and other cities where they occurred.
The Frankfurt Parliament was not totally discredited. It even managed to produce a plan for a constitutional monarchy in March 1849. Unfortunately the king of Prussia turned down the offer of the crown and states, such as Austria and Prussia, ordered their delegates home. The Revolution would see one more wave of urban violence between May and July 1849. As in September, troops were called in, and it was suppressed.
While the rulers of the German states were pleased with the demise of the Frankfurt Parliament, they did not want to reinstate the monarchy. Instead they resurrected the Confederation as a symbol of authority. The Federal Diet was assumed to have governmental authority. It moved to nullify many of the actions of the Frankfurt Parliament and revoked many of the freedoms, such as freedom of the press, which had been approved by the Parliament's members. While the governmental moves would be considered conservative and even reactionary, there were attempts to deal with the grievances which existed. The Prussian government, for example, set up a banking system to loan peasants money to pay off their feudal obligations. (11)
The purpose of a united Germany in 1815 had been that of a military buffer against France. After 1850, the goal of uniting Germany was to establish Germany as a power in its own right. It turned into a struggle between Austria and Prussia. There was a great deal of political maneuvering, but in June 1866 Bismarck maneuvered Prussia into a war with Austria which was over in seven weeks. A Prussian army of 280,000 scored a complete victory over an Austrian and Saxon force of 270,000 at Sadowa on July 3, 1866. Bismarck did not win territorial control of all of Germany by the war, but he did add Saxony, Hanover, and Hesse-Cassel. In addition, the northern part now controlled by Prussia was completely dominated by her. What emerged from the war was the North German Confederation in 1867, complete with a constitution. The constitution established a federal council, or Bundesrat, with representatives from each of the 24 member states. These representatives formed committees to supervise the government. The federal chancellor was charged with overall administration. To give the appearance of democracy, Bismarck created a parliament, the Reichstag, whose members were elected by popular vote. The Bundesrat could veto any legislation passed by the Reichstag, so it had little real power.(12)
With the north under Prussian control, Bismarck's next goal was to add the south. He believed the union would eventually take place, but did not know whether war would be necessary. When elections were held in the south in 1868 the returns went against unification. Only after Prussia had gone to war with France in 1870 would the southern states agree to join Bismarck's German state.
The Franco-Prussian War was short, although it lasted a little longer than the Austro-Prussian War of 1866. The French declared war on July 15, 1870. On September 2, not only was the French army defeated at Sedan, but their Emperor was taken prisoner. On January 28, 1871, following a siege of Paris, France agreed to an armistice. Bismarck had not waited for the French surrender before formally uniting Germany. King William of Prussia accepted the title of Emperor on January 1, 1871.
The governmental structure of the German Empire was not significantly different from that of the 1867 North German Confederation. The Bundesrat, or Federal council, was expanded to 58 seats to accommodate the new members, although Prussia held more votes. The Reichstag still was without real power, although it was elected by universal suffrage. The chancellor was the chief executive officer, appointed by the Emperor. While the individual states theoretically, and sometimes actually, were independent political bodies, the political tendency, as Europe moved closer to the First World War, was toward a unified German state.
Emperor William died in March 1888. He was succeeded by Crown Prince Frederick, who himself would live only three more months. Crown Prince William became Emperor in July 1888, as William II. In one sense governmental power was exercised by the chancellor, yet William, managed to gain control of Germany's foreign policy. That involvement would ultimately lead to an alliance with Austria-Hungary, and involvement in World War I. Whether war could have been avoided, in view of the inherent rivalries and conflict between the European powers, William's assertive personality and belligerent attitude was not much help.
The First World War both reinforced the legendary status of German military prowess while undermining it. If the leadership drew optimistic conclusions about military capabilities from Bismarck's tactics in the 1860s, they had overlooked some crucial facts. Bismarck, in spite of using Prussia's armies, had used them sparingly. Prussia fought her enemies separately. Austria had been defeated in 1866 and Prussia had four years of peace before the Franco-Prussian War began in 1870. A protracted war on two fronts, even with Germany's superbly organized military, proved too much. In 1918 her military machine collapsed.
Hitler would look back on the end of the First World War with bitterness. Blinded by a British poison gas attack in October 1918, he was in a hospital in November 1918 when the war ended. On November 9, Kaiser William agreed to abdicate as Emperor and went into exile in Holland. This was followed on November 11 by the signing of the armistice. Hitler would always believe that the army had not been beaten but was in a position to continue fighting. The army and Germany had not lost the war; they had been betrayed by the "November Criminals," who had agreed to an onerous peace when Germany was still able to fight. Hitler's belief about the army's condition at war's end was far different from the reality. He would have been horrified to learn that German soldiers, not only refused to fight, but began setting up revolutionary soldiers' councils, roughly modeled on those of their Russian counterparts. The mutiny had begun among the naval forces on October 28, when crews on two cruisers at Wilhelmshaven refused to put to sea for a raid. While naval authorities tried to quell the mutiny by arrests, it soon spread. Even the German people were not as eager to continue the war as Hitler would come to believe.
Soon after the naval forces had mutinied, the Independent Socialist party in Bavaria proclaimed itself the head of a new government (November 8, 1918). On November 9 Berlin workers took to the streets. One of the socialist leaders, Philipp Scheidemann, in speaking before the crowds, almost as an afterthought, ended his speech with the words 'long live the great German republic. 'The statement was at least enough to create the impression that a government had been formed. Friedrich Ebert, another socialist leader, acted as if there was a government in existence, and assumed control, calling himself 'imperial chancellor. (13) Without a formal government, Ebert on November 10, got the cooperation of the army leadership, now fearful of the soviet-styled soldier's councils.
In January 1919 the Communist Party decided to openly challenge Ebert and proclaimed its own revolutionary government. While some viewed such action as premature, communist workers managed to take over government buildings in Berlin. Regular army units were called in, although the officers were unsure of how far the soldier's councils had undermined discipline. To supplement the army, 'Free Corps' volunteers, members of civilian paramilitary organizations were asked to help. (Some of the Free Corps members would later evolve into Hitler's SA.) The combined army and Free Corps units had quashed the communist revolt by January 13.
Despite the street unrest, elections for a constituent assembly were held on January 19, 1919. Ebert was elected president and Scheidemann became chancellor. The assembly's primary job was not to govern, but to create a new constitution. In some ways the form of the new government resembled that created by Bismarck. The Kaiser was replaced by a president who was elected every seven years. There were still the two legislative bodies, the upper Reichsrat and the parliamentary Reichstag. The Reichsrat, while still representative of the various states (renamed Länder), no longer could veto legislation of the Reichstag. (It technically could veto legislation, but the Reichstag could override with a two-thirds vote.) The position of chancellor was filled by the president. The president was also given the authority to suspend civil liberties in an emergency. The Reichstag members were elected to four-year terms and anyone over 20 was eligible to vote. While Bismarck's government had seemed to move toward a unified German state, the new Reich went even further. Elections to the Reichstag were direct elections which tended to create a feeling of German unity. At the same time the Reichsrat, which emphasized the sovereignty of the separate states was diminished in power. Another important change was the imposition of direct taxes by the new Reich government. It did not have to rely on the individual states for its budget. (14)
The new government quickly ran into trouble when the Allies presented the final peace terms. On June 19, the cabinet refused to agree to the terms and resigned. A new government voted to accept the treaty. Even the army recognized that it was in no state to fight the Allies. On June 28, 1919 a German delegation signed the Treaty of Versailles. The territorial concessions, such as the surrender of Alsace-Lorraine to France and the transfer of West Prussia to Poland, would provide Hitler with a very specific excuse to attack the new government and the injustices of Germany's treatment under the Treaty.
The Treaty itself was only one topic about which Hitler would brood. The army would give him another. The military leadership, in the immediate aftermath of the war, wanted to avoid blame for Germany's loss. Whether they truly believed it, they publicly stated that the German army had been betrayed. Hindenburg, in an appearance before a commission investigating the war in November 1919, stated that the German army had been 'stabbed in the back.'(15) Ebert, the Social Democrat, reinforced that impression with a statement that the German army had not been defeated on the battlefield. Those who had agitated for peace had been responsible for the betrayal. The fact that Hindenburg would publicly state such ideas confirmed Hitler's own perceptions about the war.
Despite Hindenburg's later assertions, the military leadership had urged that the Versailles Treaty be signed. While they recognized the concessions Germany was making, they also understood that the German army was in no position to defend her and risked total humiliation and elimination. Hindenburg's statements cost the government in prestige and support. Despite these problems the basic form of the government had been established in 1919. It would come to be known as the Weimar Republic because its first meetings had been held in the city of Weimar, rather than Berlin.
Hindenburg's charges that the army had been betrayed may have given many ex-soldiers an official-sounding reason to dislike the Socialist-led government. It was not the only reason they opposed it. Many held anti-communist or anti-socialist views and, apart from the harsh terms of Versailles, they had an instinctive hatred of government policies. It did not take long for this resentment to be translated into action. On March 13, 1920, a group of Free Corps units, led by Wolfgang Kapp, attempted to take over Berlin and establish a new government. The Kapp Putsch, as it was known, fell apart soon after it began. While Kapp was able to seize some buildings in Berlin, a general strike by trade unionists shut the city down and Kapp left after four days. No sooner had Kapp's right-wing coup attempt failed than the government faced a threat from the left. Communists in the Ruhr, protesting Kapp's action, managed to create a 50,000-man Red Army which seized power there. The army welcomed the help of Free Corps volunteers in suppressing the revolt. A year later, in March 1921, communists tried to organize another rising in Prussia, which also was suppressed. Between 1919 and 1923, the revolts and suppression which followed would kill over 2,000 people.(16) These deaths were primarily associated with mass uprisings. There were an additional 376 political murders between 1919 and 1922. (17)
For Hitler and the ultra-right, the terms of the Versailles Treaty had been a humiliation. They created other problems, particularly in the economic sphere. Where Germany, under Bismarck, had engaged in power politics against France, the French now turned the tables. The German economy was extremely weak following the war, yet France insisted on compliance with Treaty reparation terms. In addition, France continually tried to annex German territory, such as the Rhineland. Whether French actions were motivated by revenge or by fear of a revitalized Germany, she found that Britain was less inclined to push Germany. If France saw economic opportunity in Germany's territorial possessions, England saw greater opportunity in a market for goods. Britain had economic problems of her own which motivated her to revive Germany as a potential market.(18) While Britain acted as a check, France was still able to maintain pressure for reparations.
The government was hit on several fronts. The Versailles reparations were only one burden created by the war. There was also the debt which Germany had accumulated itself during the war. At war's end the government needed to pay off 144 billion marks in war appropriations. In April 1921 the Allies demanded that she make reparation installment payments of two billion marks annually against a total payment amount of 132 billion marks plus annual payments of one-quarter of her exports.(19) The armistice agreement had taken the industrially productive Saarland and Upper Silesia. In January 1923 France moved troops into the Ruhr after Germany was declared in default on her payments. In September, Stresemann, the German chancellor, agreed to resume them.
What may have saved Germany from further economic hardship, insofar as the reparations were concerned, were some economic realities. The Allies realized that continued economic pressure was causing severe hardship. The consequence for international trade, particularly for Britain, was the continued loss of potential German markets. France was the major obstacle to a reduction of the pressure. France had two reasons for opposing leniency: first, as long Germany remained economically weak, she posed little military threat to France; second, German intransigence gave France an excuse to exploit German material resources, such as those of the Ruhr. Yet, even France found that her economic fortunes were tied to German recovery and that exploitation based on military force had an economic price. Following the occupation of the Ruhr, the value of the franc fell 25 percent in 1923. (20) This drop may have contributed to the fall of the French government the following May, which paved the way for the acceptance of the American-backed Dawes Plan in the summer of 1924. The plan substantially eased the burden on Germany by reducing the annual payments to a level Germany could afford.
With the acceptance of the Dawes Plan, Germany received an 800 million mark loan. She was helped by the withdrawal of foreign troops from her important industrial states. French troops left the Ruhr in August 1925 and part of the Rhineland in 1926. In 1925 Germany was able to enter a period of relative economic boom. It was a contrast to the economic chaos of the years which preceded it.
The turmoil of the period between 1919 and 1924 was not limited to the economic sphere. Economic problems had been bad enough to seriously impact the political system. There was widespread dissatisfaction among workers resulting in a large number of strikes. Severe inflation in 1923 ruined a majority of the middle class. Although economic problems may not have been the explanation, the Nazi movement gained strength during this time period.
Inflation was one of the problems and the war, with its debt financing, was partly to blame. Deficit financing however, did not stop with the end of the war. The government continued the policy to fund programs. The inflation which struck in 1923 was, in some ways, simply an offshoot of governmental spending policy. However, it had a very specific cause - the occupation of the Ruhr by a French and Belgian army. The occupation, which included taking over production at mining facilities, was economically disruptive. However the inflation had another cause related to German government policy. The government, not only encouraged worker resistance to the occupation by paying unemployment, it also financed that policy by printing money.
On June 24, 1922, Walter Rathenau, Germany's foreign minister, was assassinated by right-wing terrorists. If the assassination was an indication of political turmoil, economic problems became evident in July and August when there was a request for a moratorium on reparations payments. France's prime minister, Raymond Poincaré, was reluctant to grant such a concession unless France was allowed direct access to the Ruhr coal fields. In November 1922, Josef Wirth, the German chancellor, resigned. His replacement, Wilhelm Cuno, renewed the request for a moratorium. The Reparations Commission however, in December 1922, declared Germany in default. The official reason was that Germany had failed to make required timber deliveries. This was followed in January 1923 by a declaration that Germany was also in default on coal deliveries.
French and Belgian troops marched into the Ruhr on January 11, 1923 and physically seized mines and industrial facilities. The German reaction was to call for passive resistance. The government decided back this request with subsidies. When miners and workers went out on strike, the government paid them unemployment. Since it did not have the funds available to cover these expenditures, it began printing money. Inflation inevitably followed. By the end of 1923 the exchange rate for the dollar was four billion marks. (21) Internally, prices were unreal - a single egg cost 80 million marks. (22)
When the Cuno government fell in August 1923, Gustav Stresemann took over as chancellor. He announced, on September 26, that Germany would resume making reparations payments. In addition, the passive resistance campaign was ended. To bring inflation under control, Stresemann resorted to other measures. He drastically cut back on government spending, while taking steps to withdraw the inflated currency from circulation. One of the biggest drains had been the subsidies paid to keep passive resistance going. With the ending of the campaign, a major cause of inflation was brought to an end. The German government was also aided by the fact that the 1924 Dawes Plan provided her with external loans and a reduction, of her reparation obligations, in the short-term. Politically, Stresemann's offer to resume reparations, undercut the French argument for continued occupation of the Ruhr. French troops would leave in August 1925. Stresemann had help from the French electorate in May 1924, when Poincaré's party was defeated in the elections.
While Stresemann took decisive measures, any economic action takes time to work. Political events can move much more quickly. On the night of November 8-9, 1923, Adolf Hitler would stage his Beer Hall Putsch in Munich. The ultimate goal of the putsch was to overthrow the Weimar Republic. The immediate goal was to take over the government of Bavaria. Hitler's SA units, armed with machine-guns and pistols, invaded a Bavarian political social at the Bürgerbräukeller on the evening of November 8. Even though he got the crowd's attention by standing on a chair and firing a shot into the ceiling, Bavarian government officials present would not support him and the putsch fell apart. Hitler received a show of support the next day when some 2,000 of his followers marched through Munich. Unfortunately, the Bavarian "Green Police" had blocked one of the streets and when a shot was heard, the confrontation turned into a battle. Sixteen of Hitler's Nazis died. Hitler was arrested later. He was tried in February 1924 for high treason, convicted, and sentenced to five years in prison on April 1, 1924. He would be free by the end of December. While the Beer Hall Putsch was a failure, what Hitler had accomplished in even making the attempt, was an extraordinary feat - the Nazi Party had been in existence for less than five years at the time.
Under the terms of the Versailles Treaty, the size of the German army could be no more than 100,000 men. Adolf Hitler was among those who were still employed by the army following the reduction. As a "political observer" Hitler's job was to report on the activities of some of the new groups forming in the wake of the war. One of these groups was the German Workers' Party (DAP, short for Deutsche Arbeiterpartei) In September 1919 he attended one of their meetings. While he was supposed to be gathering intelligence on the group, he found its ideas so seductive that he soon became a member and also took a place on its board. It was Hitler's speaking abilities which would propel him into the leadership position. His skills were such that he was able to earn a living as a speaker. The irony was that he gained his wealth by decrying the economic conditions while those who suffered the most from unemployment financed him. The Beer Hall Putsch may provide some indication of just how persuasive Hitler was and how lucrative that talent could prove. When he arrived at the beer garden in 1923, he was riding in a Mercedes Benz. He had only attended his first DAP meeting in September 1919. When the DAP held a meeting in February 1920, Hitler attracted a crowd of 2,000.
Despite Hitler's hatred of the left, when the name of the DAP was changed shortly after the February meeting, the word "socialist" was added to the title. The party was now to be known as the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP). For Hitler there were career changes around this time. He felt secure enough in the new party setting that he retired from the army at the end of March 1920.
While Hitler's oratorical skills attracted converts to the NSDAP, the right-wing message itself was attractive to a larger audience. The National Socialists were not the only right-wing group in Germany with a following. At the core of the right-wing ideology was a nationalistic belief in the German state and a closeness to the military. Hitler's ideology focused the Party's hatred on Jews and foreigners and emphasized the ideal of the pure German race.
During 1920 the Party expanded into other regions. The expansion required it to incorporate, so it once again changed its name. In October 1920 it became the Nationalsozialistischer Deutscher Arbeiterverein (NSDAV). Its membership in January 1921 was around 3,000.As instrumental as Hitler had been in the growth of the Party, he abruptly resigned in July 1921. The reason was a proposal to merge the Party with the German Socialist Party. While it would have increased the Party's base, he felt that it would also dilute his own power. Aware that his efforts had been the major reason for its growth, the Party quickly moved to bring him back in. If he wanted back in he also set a price. He demanded, and received, the chairmanship and control of appointments. In addition to the administrative changes on Hitler's rejoining, he took steps to turn the Party into a more military organization. The organization which furnished the Nazi storm troopers, the Sturmabteilung (SA) was created, although the SA did not receive its name until October 1921.
From the 3,000 members of January 1921, the Party increased in size to 6,000 in January 1922. By November the number had again increased, to 41,000.(23) In November 1923, the time of the Beer Hall Putsch, membership had reached 55,000. (24) Some 15,000 members were also storm troopers in the SA. (25)
There is a temptation to label everything Hitler did as the actions of a fanatic. Many actions clearly were. Yet Hitler had a calculating side, concerned as much with personal ambition as with beliefs or Party principles. Like other demagogues, Hitler had the capacity to rationalize actions to fit immediate and practical political needs. His resignation from the Party in 1921, couched in the language of principle, was intended to neutralize his political opponents while increasing his own power. That is not to say that he was totally insincere or was merely acting when expressing moral outrage. When he addressed the crowd in the beer garden he had worked himself into a frenzy. Yet, the Beer Hall Putsch was hardly a spontaneous outburst. It had been planned, even if its failure indicated a miscalculation of the level of popular support or the capabilities of the storm troopers.
In the fall of 1923, Stresemann had called off the passive resistance campaign over the Ruhr and was trying to bring inflation under control. His actions, if they represented a practical solution, infuriated the ultra-right and provided Hitler with one more "grievance" against the Weimar government. With 55,000 Party members in November 1923, Hitler felt that he was in a position to attempt a takeover of the Bavarian government. Having secured that base, he could move against Berlin. However, even as he was finalizing plans for the coup in November, he was already too late. Stresemann had struck politically. In October he had used the army to put down communist governments in Saxony and Thuringia. It was considered an illegal move since the communists had legally come to power. Yet it gave Stresemann some conservative credentials, while undermining the Nazi political platform. No longer could Hitler accuse Stresemann of allying himself with the communists. While many in the army may have remained sympathetic to Hitler's ideas, they were less inclined to action against the government.
Hitler's mistake was in going through with his plan once political support for action was eroding. There was a flaw in the plan itself, as well. It relied too much on the support of members of the Bavarian government, who listened to their own constituencies. As Hitler was making final preparations they were beginning to pull back. Hitler might have done better the night of the coup, if he had maintained tighter control of the operation. While his storm troopers were beating up political opponents in Munich that night, government officials were allowed to escape and the operating units of government, such as the police, were largely left alone. The police units assembled the next day were enough to stop Hitler's 2,000 supporters when they marched, still hoping to seize control. When the police opened fire sixteen Nazis died.
Hitler slipped away from the confrontation unwounded, but he did not escape all consequences. He was tried in April 1924. He used the trial to promote his political views and those of his Party. Although he received a five-year sentence, he would serve only one year. In addition, prison conditions made his stay seem almost resort-like. He would use the time to write Mein Kampf (My battle), which would bring him wealth - he earned over eight million marks between 1925 and 1945. (26)
On December 20, 1924, Hitler was released from Landsberg prison. In his absence, not only had membership fallen, but the Party had been officially banned throughout Germany. He had tried to provide some guidance while in prison, but found that various factions within the Party were tending to pull it apart. Tired of being asked to mediate, in the summer of 1924 he informed members that he was withdrawing from active participation.
He had no intention of abandoning the Party. His first task, on his release, was to get the ban lifted in Bavaria. He visited with the Bavarian prime minister, Dr. Heinrich Held, in January 1925. While Held may not have been convinced of Hitler's peaceful intentions he lifted the ban. Hitler almost lost even this concession when he held a rally in February at the same beer hall where he had staged the putsch. The fact that 4,000 people showed up alarmed the Bavarian authorities, who banned him from further public speaking. The ban would remain in effect through March 1927.
Hitler was still able to build his organization. Party membership, once as high as 55,000, had fallen to 27,000 in 1925. Hitler was able to increase it to 35,000 in 1926, then to 75,000 in 1927. When the Great Depression hit in 1929, membership had reached 108,000. (27) The growth experienced by the Party as a whole was reflected in the SA, which had over 30,000 members in 1929. While growth was important to Hitler he also wanted a more committed membership and he began to rid the Party of political opponents. The Party which would emerge at the end of the 1920s was one more dedicated and more personally loyal to Hitler.
Considering its tiny beginnings, only 2,000 members in 1920, the fact that it received 810,000 votes in the May 1928 elections was also a major feat. Yet, that showing represented only 2.6 percent of the total vote and gave the Nazis only 12 seats in the Reichstag, which had 491 members. (28) The poor showing convinced Hitler that a tactical change was needed. Between 1926 and 1928 Hitler had been trying to cultivate support among city dwellers. While the growth in SA membership suggests that there was a mob of urban unemployed waiting to join the Nazis, that impression is deceptive. Workers were found to strongly favor either the socialists or the communists. After the 1928 elections Hitler sought to cultivate rural voters.(29)
Both urban and rural voters had reason to worry about economic conditions. At the time of the New York stock market crash of October 1929 1.3 million Germans were unemployed. (30) The unemployment was a symptom of Germany's internal problems. It was foreseeable that a crash in New York would have some impact on the German economy. The severity of that impact however, came as something of a shock. It was not so much that the German economy was necessarily tied closely to the economic fortunes of another country, such as the United States. A more basic problem was that Germany's markets were inherently weak. As a result, German industry had come to rely on artificial measures, such as abnormally high borrowing, to sustain markets. When American investors began calling in German loans in the weeks following the Crash, German businesses began to go under or were forced to cut back on operations. A second problem was that German industry was dependent on the U.S. as a market for its products. When the U.S. market began to shrink, German manufacturers quickly saw sales fall off.(31)
In December 1929 the number of unemployed was 1,892,000, out of a work force of 19,761,000 or an unemployment rate of 9.5 percent. In December 1930 the number of unemployed had grown to 3,076,000 or 15.7 percent. (32) The increase in unemployment caused the collapse of the government in March 1930. The major issue was an increase in the unemployment benefit. The battle essentially pitted the employers against the employees. The Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the People's Party (DVP) had jointly ruled in what was known as the "Great Coalition." The SPD not only wanted to increase the unemployment fund, but also favored greater employer contributions. The DVP, representing the employers, opposed the plan. (33) To form a new government Hindenburg appointed Heinrich Brüning chancellor. Brüning dissolved the Reichstag and called for new elections. The date for the elections was September 14, 1930.
The Nazi Party was in a much better position to exploit this opportunity than it had been in May 1928. Hitler's major advantage, in one sense, was that he had not changed his basic message. The message still evoked images of a greater Germany, while blaming the Jews, the communists, and the government leaders who had sold out in 1919, for Germany's problems. (34) At the same time, Hitler had changed strategies. The strategy did not involve a workers' program patterned after a communist model. In fact Otto Strasser was expelled from the Party in the spring of 1930 for advocating such an economic solution. The strategy instead was based on an appeal to empathy - Hitler "understood" the problems of the little man. (35) While he offered sympathy, he seemed unwilling to compromise on his basic program - the solution to all economic problems was to follow the Nazi plan. Where he did compromise was on tactics. He tailored his message somewhat to different audiences and targeted the part of the electorate which would provide votes. The urban strategy had failed in 1928. The Party now sought support in rural areas and among the middle class.
In January 1930 the Nazi Party had 178,000 members. When the elections were held on September 14, it was clear that the increase in Nazi support was not limited to those who had joined the Party. Where they had only received 810,000 votes in the May 1928 elections, they now received 6.4 million, which was about 18 percent (compared to the 2.6 percent of 1928). This gave them nearly one-fifth of the Reichstag seats (107 out of 577).(36) The publicity which followed caused another 100,000 people to join the Party before the end of 1930.
With 107 seats the Nazis were unable to pass legislation of their own, but they did obstruct the Reichstag as much as possible. Despite their actions, the Brüning government was able to avoid total collapse through much of 1931. Brüning, despite his inability to control the Reichstag and Hitler's attempt to oust him in October, would not be asked to resign as chancellor until May of 1932.
Hindenburg's term as president expired on May 5, 1932. In February Hitler announced that he would seek the office, even though he had doubts about running against Hindenburg. In December 1931, he had behind him a membership of 800,000, with an accompanying SA membership of 225,000. Unemployment had increased to 4,520,000 or 24 percent. (37) The election was held on March 13. While Hitler's chances of defeating Hindenburg were slim, the winner needed over 50 percent of the vote to claim the office. Hindenburg's total, 18,651,497, was 49.7 percent, just short of the majority required. If Hitler was far short of that figure, with 11,339,446 votes, or 30.2 percent, he had received enough votes to force a runoff. In the runoff election between Hindenburg and Hitler, held on April 10, Hindenburg gained almost a million votes, while Hitler added two million to his total. The final vote gave Hindenburg 53 percent to Hitler's 36.8 percent, or in raw numbers, 19,359,983 to 13,418,547. (38)
By the end of 1932 unemployment would reach 5,575,000, or 30.8 percent. (39) Nazi Party membership had gone above a million members in July, when 1932 was only half over. Brüning had resigned in May and Hindenburg replaced him with Franz von Papen. Papen moved quickly to create a new government. The Reichstag was dissolved and new elections were set for July 31. The Nazis did even better than they had done in the April presidential runoff, receiving some 13,700,000 votes and increasing the number of Reichstag seats to 230. (40) Hitler believed the election results were sufficient to allow him to take over the government. If he was inclined to interpret the results as a form of popular mandate, he forgot that governmental power was still one step removed from popular elections. Hindenburg still controlled the government, if only because he decided who to appoint. Hitler was reminded of this fact in August. At a meeting with Papen he threw a fit and threatened a takeover if not given complete control. He was not only rebuked by Hindenburg the same afternoon, but Hindenburg's office followed up with a press release detailing Hitler's actions. (41) If Hindenburg was prepared to stand up to Hitler, he was not willing to commit totally to Papen. Papen was expected to find a way to end the political stalemate. When the new Reichstag met in September, he had already decided to dismiss it. After meeting only a few hours, the Reichstag was again dissolved. The new elections were scheduled for November 6, 1932.
Based on the still serious unemployment and the growth in Party membership, the Nazis should have gained even more seats in the new elections. Yet Hitler's now-public August tantrum had cost his Party support. In addition, the Nazis gave the impression of wavering over long-standing principles. Despite their instinctive opposition to communism, they joined with the communists in a transport strike in Berlin just four days before the election. When the election results were tallied they had received two million fewer votes. They now had only 196 seats in the Reichstag, a loss of 34. (42)
In spite of this setback, they remained a powerful political force. Papen, who had only served as chancellor since June, resigned on November 17. Hitler once again approached Hindenburg about taking over the government. Again Hindenburg refused to appoint him and requested the recently-resigned Papen to take over again. Papen's new appointment lasted less than a day. What he proposed was considered extreme. He wanted to suppress all political parties and assume dictatorial powers until a new constitution could be approved. When he could not find support among the cabinet members, Hindenburg felt compelled to replace him with General Kurt von Schleicher.
In many ways the advantage now lay with Hitler. Schleicher, although initially a supporter of Papen, had schemed to oust him. Yet Schleicher, like Papen, assumed that he could use political tricks to manipulate the government. The problem was that neither Papen nor Schleicher had a political base to use in negotiations. Each had to rely on some other source of power, such as the army. While Hitler's popular support might rise or fall, he could count on the committed support of Party members. In addition, Hitler's SA provided a physical force which, in numbers, could rival the army.
Hitler's political opportunity came in January 1933.Papen, betrayed by Schleicher, now decided to use Hitler to get revenge. In a series of meetings with Hitler Papen negotiated a joint government which would replace that of Schleicher. Schleicher, who found that he had no better success than Papen at governing, resigned on January 28. Papen had persuaded Hindenburg that he should once more take over. Unfortunately he also had persuaded him that Hitler should be given the chancellery. On January 30, 1933, Hindenburg appointed Hitler to the post. At the time unemployment stood at 6,013,612. SA membership would continue to grow through 1933 and 1934. By May 1933 it had reached two million and by September 1933 2.5 million. Whether that growth was related to unemployment is not clear. Unemployment began to fall during 1933, dropping to 4,804,000 by the end of 1933, while SA membership reached three million in 1934. (43) It seems more likely that membership by this time was seen as a way to career advancement or job security.
If Hitler's appointment to the chancellery was a personal milestone, it also represented a radical change in political operations. He had used the political power of the masses to gain control of the government. Once in power the governmental apparatus provided a more effective method of control. Hitler still used the Party, but he was able to dispense with many of the people who had helped him on the way up. In eighteen months he was able to advance from the position of chancellor to absolute dictator of Germany.
(1) Stanley G. Payne, "A History of Fascism: 1914-1945," The University of Wisconsin Press, (Madison, WI 1995), p. 217.
(2) Stanley G. Payne, "A History of Fascism," p. 171.
(3) William Carr, "A History of Germany: 1815-1990," Fourth ed., Edward Arnold, (New York, NY 1991), p. 171.
(4) Stanley G. Payne, "A History of Fascism," p. 89.
(5) Stanley G. Payne, "A History of Fascism," p. 104.
(6) Alec Nove, "An Economic History of the U.S.S.R.: 1917-1991," 3rd ed., Penguin Books, (New York, NY 1992), p. 112.
(7) Moshe Lewin, "The Making of the Soviet System," p. 219.
(8) Daniel Guerin, "Fascism and Big Business," Pathfinder Press, (New York, NY 1973), p. 104.
(9) Stanley G. Payne, "A History of Fascism," pp. 115-116.
(10) William Carr, "A History of Germany," p. 35.
(11) William Carr, "A History of Germany," p. 65.
(12) William Carr, "A History of Germany," p. 107.
(13) William Carr, "A History of Germany," p. 240.
(14) William Carr, "A History of Germany," p. 254.
(15) William Carr, "A History of Germany," p. 263.
(16) Stanley G. Payne "A History of Fascism," p. 171.
(17) William Carr, "A History of Germany," p. 269.
(18) William Carr, "A History of Germany," p. 271.
(19) William Carr, "A History of Germany," pp. 270-271.
(20) William Carr, "A History of Germany," p. 278.
(21) William Carr, "A History of Germany," p. 273.
(22) Klaus P. Fisher, "Nazi Germany: A New History," The Continuum Publishing Company, (New York, NY 1995), p. 72.
(23) William Carr, "Nazi Germany: A New History," pp. 127, 131, 143.
(24) Jackson J. Spielvogel, "Hitler and Nazi Germany: A History," 3rd ed., Prentice-Hall, Inc., (Upper Saddle River, NJ 1988), p. 34.
(25) Stanley G. Payne, "A History of Fascism," p. 154.
(26) Klaus P. Fisher, "Nazi Germany: A New History," p. 164.
(27) Jackson J. Spielvogel, "Hitler and Nazi Germany: A History," p. 46.
(28) Klaus P. Fisher, "Nazi Germany: A New History," p. 204.
(29) Klaus P. Fisher, "Nazi Germany: A New History," pp. 203-204.
(30) Jackson J. Spielvogel, "Hitler and Nazi Germany: A History," p. 53.
(31) Klaus P. Fisher, "Nazi Germany: A New History," pp. 215-216.
(32) Lewis L. Lorwin, "National Planning in Selected Countries," National Resources Planning Board, (Washington, D.C. 1941), Table I, p. 39.
(33) Jackson J. Spielvogel, "Hitler and Nazi Germany: A History," p. 54.
(34) Jackson J. Spielvogel, "Hitler and Nazi Germany: A History," p. 53.
(35) Klaus P. Fisher, "Nazi Germany: A New History," p. 224.
(36) Klaus P. Fisher, "Nazi Germany: A New History," pp. 227.
(37) Lewis L. Lorwin, "National Planning in Selected Countries," Table I, p. 39.
(38) Klaus P. Fisher, "Nazi Germany: A New History," pp. 237.
(39) Lewis L. Lorwin, "National Planning in Selected Countries," Table I, p. 39.
(40) Klaus P. Fisher, "Nazi Germany: A New History," pp. 246.
(41) Klaus P. Fisher, "Nazi Germany: A New History," pp. 247.
(42) Klaus P. Fisher, "Nazi Germany: A New History," pp. 249.
(43) Lewis L. Lorwin, "National Planning in Selected Countries," Table VI, p. 13.
Lev Bezymenski, "The Death of Adolf Hitler," Harcourt, Brace & World, (New York, NY 1968).
Karl Bracher, "The German Dictatorship," Praeger, (New York, NY 1970).
Alan Bullock, "Hitler: A Study in Tyranny," Bantam, (New York, NY 1961).
William Carr, "A History of Germany: 1815-1990," Fourth Ed., Edward Arnold, (New York, NY 1991).
James Compton, "The Swastika and the Eagle," Houghton Mifflin, (Boston 1967).
Ralf Dahrendorf, "Society and Democracy in Germany," Doubleday-Anchor, (New York, NY 1969).
Jacques Delarue, "The Gestapo," William Morrow, (New York, NY 1964).
Andreas Dorpalen, "Hindenburg and the Weimar Republic," Princeton University Press, (Princeton, NJ 1964).
Anthony Eden, "Facing the Dictators," Cassell, (London 1962).
Klaus P. Fisher, "Nazi Germany: A New History," The Continuum Publishing Company, (New York, NY 1995).
Gerald Freund, "Unholy Alliance," Harcourt, Brace, (New York, NY 1957).
Max Gallo, "The Night of Long Knives," Harper & Row, (New York, NY 1972).
Harold J. Gordon, Jr., "Hitler and the Beer Hall Putsch," Princeton University Press, (Princeton, NJ 1972).
Daniel Guerin, "Fascism and Big Business," Pathfinder Press, (New York, NY 1973).
Alistair Hamilton, "The Appeal of Fascism," Blond, (London 1971).
Richard Hanser, "Putsch!," Peter H. Wyden, (New York, NY 1970).
Robert Herzstein, "Adolf Hitler and the Third Reich," Houghton Mifflin, (Boston 1971).
Trumbull Higgins, "Hitler and Russia," MacMillan, (New York, NY 1966).
Franz Jetzinger, "Hitler's Youth," Hutchinson, (London 1958).
Max H. Kele, "Nazis and Workers," University of North Carolina Press, (Chapel Hill 1972).
Helmut Krausnick etc., "Anatomy of the SS State," Walker, (New York, NY 1968).
Walter Lacqueur, "Russia and Germany," Little, Brown, (Boston 1965).
Lewis L. Lorwin, "National Planning in Selected Countries," National Resources Planning Board, (Washington, D.C. 1941).
William Manchester, "The Arms of Krupp," Bantam Books, (New York, NY 1970).
James McSherry, "Stalin, Hitler and Europe, 1933-1939," World, (Cleveland 1970).
Ernst Nolte, "Three Faces of Fascism," Holt, Rinehart and Winston, (New York, NY 1966).
Dietrich Orlow, "The History of the Nazi Party, 1919-1933," David and Charles, (Newton Abbot 1971).
Franz von Papen, "Memoirs," Deutsch, (London 1952).
Stanley G. Payne, "A History of Fascism: 1914-1945," The University of Wisconsin Press, (Madison, WI 1995).
Geoffrey Pridham, "Hitler's Rise to Power," Harper & Row, (New York, NY 1973).
Anthony Read and David Fisher, "Kristallnacht: The Nazi Night of Terror," Random House, (New York, NY 1989).
A. J. Ryder, "The German Revolution of 1918," Cambridge University Press, (Cambridge 1967).
William L. Shirer, "The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany," Simon and Schuster, (New York, NY 1960).
William Sofsky, Translated by William Templer, "The Order of Terror: The Concentration Camp," Princeton University Press, (Princeton, NJ 1993).
Albert Speer, Translated by Richard and Clara Winston, "Inside the Third Reich: Memoirs," The MacMillan Company, (New York, NY 1970).
Jackson J. Spielvogel, "Hitler and Nazi Germany: A History," 3rd ed., Prentice-Hall, Inc., (Upper Saddle River, NJ 1988).
John Toland, "Adolf Hitler," Ballantine Books, (New York, NY 1976).
H. R. Trevor-Roper, "The Last Days of Hitler," MacMillan, (New York, NY 1947).
Jan Weiner, "The Assassination of Heydrich," Grossman Publishers, (New York, NY 1969).
John Weiss, "Nazis and Fascists in Europe, 1918-1945," Quadrangle Press, (New York, NY 1969).
| [Home] | [Theory] | [Origins] | [Nations] | [Empires] | [History] | [Resources] | [Geology] | [Book] |